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Abstract
Modern democracies rely on civic participation, namely through voting. In this
work, I use rational choice theory and the paradox of voting to analyse individuals’
voting motivations using data of the Portuguese electorate, collected and built by me
(1200 observations). As a novel contribution to the discussion, I conduct a randomized
controlled trial using two treatments. One tests the importance of the act of voting
while the other tests the probability of being pivotal in an election. I find individuals
vote because they value the act of voting – warm glow voting. Finally, I find evi-
dence suggesting that providing information about the importance of voting increases
turnout while there is no impact of information about the probability of being pivotal.
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Aknowledgements: I o↵er my sincere gratitude to everyone who made this work possible.
To my advisor, Susana Peralta, who provided guidance and help at every moment. To
my parents, Sofia and Pedro, who gave me all their support and advice. To everyone who
reviewed my work and gave me their suggestions. Finally, to everyone who answered and





2 Literature Review 6
2.1 The classical theory of the calculus of voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Alternative models in the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Empirical results in the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 The Portuguese Electoral System 9
4 Data 11
4.1 Dataset Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Basic Descriptive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 Empirical Strategy 15
5.1 Analysis of the calculus of voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2 The Mobilization Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3 Randomized Controlled Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3.1 The Sense of Duty Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3.2 The Pivotal Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6 Results 20
6.1 Calculus of Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2 The Mobilization Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22





1 Turnout rate in latest national elections (OECD countries, 2016).1 . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Electoral districts and respective members of parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Legislative elections (2015), outcome. Abstention was 43.07%. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4 Presidential elections (2016), outcome. Abstention was 51.34%. . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Municipal elections (2013), outcome (winning party). Abstention was 52.60%. . . . 11
List of Tables
1 Variables built from the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Comparison between collected data and population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Description of the variables used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Turnout sorted by vote importance and sense of duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Results of the calculus of voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Results of the calculus of voting, sorted by duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7 Results of the mobilization estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22




Tackling the decrease in turnout is one of the biggest challenges in modern democracies,
where abstention has been increasing over the last decades. A reduction in political parties’
mobilization capacity, traditionally associated with influencing many peripheral voters to
turnout, due to an increase in the cost of mobilization may be one of the causes of this
common phenomena in western democracies (Gray and Caul, 2000). Also, institutional
procedures seem to a↵ect turnout, as compulsory voting and easy voter’s registration have
a significant impact increasing turnout (Geys, 2006). Higher abstention is likely to translate
into a greater distance between the electorate and the elected representatives, possibly
creating a biased democratic representation towards who votes, as elected o cials tend to
respond to the preferences of those who turnout (Gri n and Newman, 2005).
Turnout rates di↵er substantially across countries and ages, as suggested by Figure 1.
Also, young people, between 18 and 24, are 17% less likely to cast their vote than older
adults (OECD, 2016).2
Figure 1: Turnout rate in latest national elections (OECD countries, 2016).3
Source: OECD, 2016
4 It urges to understand the main causes to vote or not to vote, so policy makers can
design better institucional policies to increase voter turnout.5
2Voting is compulsory in Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico, parts of Switzerland and
Turkey.
3https://www.oecd.org/social/family/CO 4 2 Participation first time voters.pdf
4Following a similar reasoning, minority parties should be favoured as turnout rates increase (Bernhagen
and Marsh, 1997).
5However, abstention may not be necessarily bad. There is a field of research on the so-called swing
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1 Introduction
In this essay I have two main goals. First, I aim to understand the calculus of voting.6 I
build an individual dataset about the last Portuguese legislative (2015), presidential (2015)
and municipal (2013) elections, based on a survey built specifically for this work and con-
taining information about the impact of the cost of voting, the expected gains from elections’
outcome, sense of duty and social networks on voters’ turnout. After, I focus on legislative
elections and run a randomized controlled trial, using two treatments, to analyse how they
a↵ect the likelihood of future voting. One group is shown a pivotal treatment, providing
information about the likelihood they may a↵ect the outcome of the election. The other
group is shown a sense of duty treatment and were provided information from o cial bodies
stating how important the civic act of voting is.
This work brings two main contributions. First, it is one of first empirical works in
Portugal (to the extent of my knowledge) running a survey at the individual level, assessing
voting motivations and the calculus of voting among the Portuguese electorate, modelling it
according to the rational choice theory.7 Second, this work runs a randomized controlled trial
and finds significant statistical evidence that providing information about the importance
of voting induces higher turnout. This finding is of major importance as it can help policy
makers designing better policies to promote higher turnout.
The rest of this paper is structured as following: In the next two sections I cover the
relevant topics in the literature, in the context of this article, and characterize the Portuguese
electoral system. From sections 3 to 5 I explain my methodology, detailing the data I
collected and used and the econometric analysis. In section 6 I show my results and discuss
them, concluding in section 8 with the most important remarks of this paper and some ideas
for future research.
voter’s curse (individuals indi↵erent between candidates that decide not to vote even if voting is costless
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). More recently, these theoretical predictions have been empirically
confirmed in laboratory studies (Morton and Palfrey, 2010).
6The rational decision to vote or not to vote, as defined by Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968).
(Please refer to the next section for more details).
7Magalhães (2008) already used an individual dataset but the analysis was on the impact of social




2.1 The classical theory of the calculus of voting
The initial attempts to rationalize the decision to vote go back to the idea of the calculus
of voting, firstly developed by Downs (1957) and later formalized by Riker and Ordeshook
(1968). According to it, the individual decision to turnout depends on the rational trade-o↵
between the cost of voting and its gains. Also, these include an instrumental component
(directly linked to the outcome of the election) and a non-instrumental component (the
increase in utility due to the act of voting). This model for the calculus of voting can be
formalized as following:
V = P    C +D (1)
V is the individual reward from voting, and should be positive in order for an individual to
vote. This reward depends on P , how likely the voter believes to be pivotal in the election8;
 , which is the di↵erence in benefit for the individual when his favourite candidate wins
the election; the cost of voting, C, which includes the di culty of going to the poll and the
time the individual takes to get information about candidates.
Downs (1957) argued that in large elections (for example, legislative elections) the prob-
ability that an individual casts the decisive vote (P ) should be very close to zero and even if
the cost of voting is very small, P  should be even lower and no one should vote. This is the
so-called Paradox of Voting, which Riker and Ordeshook (1968) tried to solve by incluing
D as the non-intrumental motivations leading individuals to turnout.
The sense of duty, D, was only included by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), accounting for
the non-instrumental components motivating voters’ turnout.9 Understanding this compo-
nent plays a major role for explaining the paradox of voting (Blais, 2000).10 After the initial
8
P is a probability
9According to the authors, D can simply be the moral obligation to vote or can also be driven by a
necessity to a rm partisan preferences or allegiance to the political system (which is very close to the
previous idea of voting to maintain democracy.)
10Blais criticizes Riker and Ordeshook for using datasets not specificly designed for the calculus of voting,
mainly because they were assuming C and P to be linked to the closeness of the election, similarly as
Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975), and not as an individual’s perception. He also suggests that besides D
citizens could also go vote to maintain democracy. If the expected benefit of the election is very small
and every citizen decides individually not to turnout, the democratic system fails. Moreover, if individuals
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models by Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), a new approach of the calculus of
voting, based on the strategic behaviour of voters, appeared (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,
1985). According to it, large electorates do not necessarily mean zero or low turnout, with
Individuals behaving strategically in a game-theoretical framework.11
2.2 Alternative models in the literature
The failure of the basic calculus of voting to explain the magnitude of the turnout rate
in democracies has prompted a number of theoretical contributions which depart from the
purely self-interested, fully rational voter. One is the Mobilization Model, proposed by
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), which assumes that social networks pressure people to
turnout. It expects people interested in politics, members of political parties and those who
su↵er pressure from their family and peers to be more likely to turnout. Thus, politicians
can increase turnout by mobilizing these groups. 12 More recently, evidence from a field
experiment suggests the threat of publicizing the names of non-voters (in their own com-
munities) induces higher turnout (Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008), evidencing a social
pressure mechanism inducing turnout. Also, some argue there is a social selection process in
which individuals build their social networks (Magalhães, 2008). Usually, this process is not
random and individuals tend be sorrounded by people with ideas close to theirs. Magalhães
(2008) finds that in Portugal this social network e↵ect has an impact in turnout greater
than individual interest in politics or political filiation, being amplified as an individual
feels closer to the individuals in his network.
2.3 Empirical results in the literature
Empirical results suggest most people do not perceive any costs of voting, or, when they
do so, they are extremely low or even negligible (Blais, 2000). In Blais’s (2000) seminal
realize that the rational decision is not to go vote, they may decide to bear the cost of voting in order to
maintain democracy as they do not expect other people to turnout.
11According to the authors, turnout can even increase with an increase of the cost of voting as voters
adapt their behaviour, a↵ecting how they perceive to be pivotal.




book and in many of his papers, the author measured the cost of voting as distance to the
polls, the subjective assessment of the di culty to vote, or the cost of information about
the candidacies.
Regarding the sense of duty, D, it seems to be positively a↵ected by political interest,
cultural variables (such as religiosity) and also by socio-economic indicators (gender, age and
income), while education does not seem to have an impact (Blais, 2000). When estimating
separately for individuals with high and low sense of duty, the author finds that P and
political interest have a significant impact increasing turnout among individuals with low
sense of duty. Those are the ones more sensitive to B, P and C while individuals with
a strong sense of duty do not calculate costs and benefits and will always vote.13 These
results corroborate previous findings showing that rain decreases turnout only in individuals
showing low sense of duty (Knack 1994).
Also, regarding how much people perceive their vote to be decisive, turnout seems to be
higher for closer elections (Blais, 2000) and smaller populations (Geys, 2006), suggesting
people vote when they perceive their vote to worth more. According to Blais, P does not
have a significant impact explaining the voting decision. Also, voters do not seem to clearly
understand the probability of being pivotal (P ), commonly overestimating it. However,
some have argued more recently that voters behaviour towards turnout should be looked
separately for those who are instrumental voters and those who are non-instrumental voters
(Ungureanu and Roescu, 2015). They find that instrumental voters make their decision
based on a cost-benefit analysis, perceiving costs to be high but, at the same time, over-
estimating the probability of being pivotal.14 Non-instrumental voters seem to correctly
estimate P but do not make their decision base on a cost-benefit analysis.
Turnout also seems to vary across types of elections. It is higher in legislative elections
and lower in local ones (Blais, 2000). A possible explanation is in voters’ perception that
local elections play a smaller role in day-to-day life. Other alternative is that local elections
are less politicized than government, as data shows higher turnout rates in countries where
13Blais warns about the possibility individuals, when asked, say that voting is a civic duty, as they perceive
it a social norm.
14Ungureanu and Roescu also find that these voters are the only thinking in the possibility their favourite
candidate loses without their vote
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local elections are highly politicized. Blais (2000) also analyses presidential elections in semi-
presidentialist countries,15 showing that the turnout rates are not much di↵erent than those
in legislative elections, although one could consider the president to represent a much smaller
role than government in day-to-day life. One possible explanation is the personalization of
presidential elections (Blais, 2000).
In the specific case of Portugal, previous work suggests that turnout rates are lower in
more populated areas (Amaro de Matos, Barros and Pereira, 2009), raising the possible
explanation that turnout can be linked to social network e↵ects which can be more diluted
in more populated areas. The same authors also find that geography and education do not
have a significant impact in Portuguese turnout. However, the authors find that in Portugal
higher income individuals are less likely to turnout, which is intriguing since previous findings
(Amaro de Matos and Barros, 2004) show this same group is more likely to have stronger
social networks and therefore to be more likely to turnout.
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that providing information (before the elections)
about the importance of voting plays a significant role increasing voters turnout (Gine and
Mansuri, 2010). Hence, providing impersonal information about the elections to potential
voters also seems do significantly induce turnout (Dale and Strauss, 2009).
3 The Portuguese Electoral System
In Portugal there are legislative, presidential, municipal and European elections. In the
legislative and municipal elections, votes are converted into seats according to the Hondt
method, while in presidential elections there is a unique national district that elects the
president through a direct vote, majoritarian system.16,17 In legislative elections only po-
litical parties can run, presenting closed lists of candidates for members of parliament. In
municipal elections independent lists are allowed and in presidential elections any person
15Portugal fits in this kind of model. The political system is designed to have a national government and
a President (Head of State) with limited powers.
16In the presidential election, there is a run-o↵ in case one of the candidates does not collect more than
50% of the votes in the first round.
17There are also elections for the European Parliament, which are out of the scope of my analysis.
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(following certain criteria) can run.18
In the legislative elections 230 members of the national parliament are elected according
to 22 electoral districts, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Electoral districts and respective members of parliament
Source: CNE (National Elections Committee), 2015.
Each district elects a number of members of parliament proportional to its population,
following the Hondt method (approximately one member of parliament per 40 thousand
individuals). The biggest district is Lisbon and the smallest is Portalegre. The outcome of
the legislative elections of October 2015 is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Legislative elections (2015), outcome. Abstention was 43.07%.
Source: RTP.19
18National and local governments are elected for a 4 years term while the president is elected for a 5 years
term. Presidential candidates cannot be funded by political parties.
19The 4 seats missing corresponded to the European and non-European electoral districts and were





The outcome of the last presidential (January 2016) and municipal (September 2013)
elections is shown in Figures 4 and 5:
Figure 4: Presidential elections (2016), outcome. Abstention was 51.34%.
Source: RTP.20




I collected data on 1211 individuals.22 The survey was designed and operationalized for
this work in Qualtrics and distributed through digital platforms, such as e-mail and social
media, during November of 2016. Before, in the second half of October, I conducted a pilot,
getting 30 observations.23 The distribution mechanism used becomes a limitation of my
20http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/eleicoes/presidenciais/2016
21https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese local election, 2013.





dataset as it was biased towards my personal social network, although I tried to mitigate
this issue by controlling for several factors. The survey was written in Portuguese as my
group of interest was the Portuguese electorate. The questions were based in questionnaires
previously developed and tested by Blais.24
The survey starts with common questions for individual’s socio-demographic characteri-
zation, followed by a section about political interest and voting costs, C. There are questions
aimed to measure B and D in the last legislative elections. After, individuals are subjected
to a randomized controlled trial, being randomly assigned into one of three groups. Indi-
viduals in the first group were shown a sense of duty treatment, aimed to test its impact in
D, by providing a set of impersonal information collected from Portuguese o cial author-
ities.25 Individuals in the second group were shown a pivotal treatment, aimed to test its
impact in P  by providing information about the non-usage of some votes due to the precise
methodology used in Portugal (Hondt method) to convert votes into seats. Individuals in
the third group were shown a placebo treatment. The latter was constructed such that it
was not correlated with turnout or elections. The three treatments were designed to be read
approximately in same amount of time, and can be seen in the figures below:26
Pivotal Treatment
In Portugal, the calculation of the number of mandates obtained by each party follows the ”Hondt
Method”. In practice, the method used causes the votes of some voters to end up not being counted
towards the election of mandates. That is, the votes of these voters have no impact on the allocation
of mandates. In this context, after the legislative elections of 2015, Jornal Expresso published the
following article: ”In these legislative elections, there were approximately 762,000 votes (14.65%),
which corresponds to more than the total number of votes obtained by both the BE and the CDU. For
example, in the district of Portalegre 59,004 people voted and two deputies were elected, one for PS and
one for PSD. PS received 25,037 votes and PSD / CDS-PP 16,303. After The calculation of the Hondt
method concludes that the PS had a surplus of 8,734 votes and the PSD / CDS-PP 3,785. Counting
the votes of all political parties in this circle, 28,159 votes had no representation in mandates.”
(Expresso, 10/18/2015)
Sense of Duty Treatment
In Portugal, the right to vote is enshrined in the law, in particular with Article 81 of the Electoral Law
of the Assembly of the Republic: ”Su↵rage is a right and a civic duty”.
As the law mentions, besides being a right, voting is also a duty. According to the Voter’s Portal
24(Blais, 2000), further details in the bibliography section.
25Portal do Eleitor and Portuguese National Election Commission (CNE). Impersonal information refers
to a treatment which is not directed to a specific individual (Dale and Strauss, 2009).
26Original treatments in Portuguese, including the placebo, shown in the appendix.
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(Portal do Eleitor), we must vote ”because we are born in a democratic state, where citizens exercise
political power through universal, equal and direct su↵rage. Citizens must recognize their value and
be aware of the struggle that many men and women have done to conquer it. In exercising its right to
vote, the citizen is contributing to its strengthening and consolidation. ”
(Adapted from Portal do Eleitor)
One of the main limitations of the treatments is the impossibility to verify if individuals
paid enough attention understanding them. As the survey was distributed online, it was
impossible to equally provide the treatments among individuals.
After treatments were shown, respondents were asked to answer several types of ques-
tions, namely the probability they cast the pivotal vote (P ) and their sense of duty. Also,
there were two last sections. One about compulsory voting and the application of sanctions
to individuals who abstain. Finally, there was a section about presidential and municipal
elections, asking the same questions were asked before about legislative elections.
Below, Table 1 explains the main variables built from the sample’s data:27
Table 1: Variables built from the data
Variable Name Description
Dependent Variables
vtdles, vtdpres, vtdaut Dependent variable for self-reporting to have voted in legislative,
presidential and municipal elections, respectively
probvote intention of voting if the next legislative elections (1=sure not to vote, 2=unsure 3=sure to vote)
probvote dummy intention of voting if the next legislative elections (1= sure to vote, 2=otherwise)
Characterization Controls
age variable for the age completed in 2016
masc Dummy for being a men
lvtgth Dummy for living together with a significant other (individuals
may be married or not)
emp Dummy for being employed (employee or self-employed)
north, lis, south, isld Dummy for living in the north of Portugal, in Lisbon region,
in the South or in the Islands, respectively. Centre is omitted
higheduc Dummy for having a higher education degree
highincome Dummy for having a high income (above 19.000 euros)
lvabroad Dummy for living or having lived abroad
rel Dummy for being religious
Cost of Voting
ezyvote Dummy for considering voting to be easy
Non-Instrumental Variables
duty Dummy for considering voting as a duty (showed before treatment)
Instrumental Variables28
di✏egis, di↵pres, di↵aut The di↵erence in utility, in a percentual scale, that individual gets
if favourite candidate wins in legislative, presidential and
municipal elections, respectively
probdecisl, probdecisp, probdecisa Probability, perceived by the individual, to cast the decisive
vote in legislative, presidential and municipal elections, respectively
Proxy for P
expbenlegis, expbenpres, expbenaut Proxy for P  (interaction of P and  )
Mobilization variables
intrst Dummy for being interested in politics
filiated Dummy for currently being filiated in a political party
set peerpress Dummy for agreeing that votes when peers, family and
friends also vote
Treatments
treat duty Dummy for information treatment, telling individuals they
should vote because it is a civil duty
treat pivotal Dummy for Information treatment, telling individuals that due
to the Hondt method, more than 700 thousand votes are not
used to elect members of parliament in legislative elections
treat placebo Information treatment, control group
27The complete survey is available in the appendix.
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4.2 Basic Descriptive Analysis
Key descriptive indicators are presented in Tables 2 and 3:
Table 2: Comparison between collected data and population.
Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population
Age Dist. Gender Geography
15-24 35.1% 13.5% Males 47.6% 48.7% North 15.7% 35.2%
25-54 50.1% 49.6% Centre 7.1% 22.4%
55-64 8.9% 14.3% Lisbon 61.6% 19.1%
65+ 5.8% 22.7% Political Pref. South 11.0% 18.6%
PAF 47.2% 38.5% Islands 4.6% 4.6%
Completed Educ. PS 25.2% 32.31%
No education 0.% 8.3% BE 10.0% 10.19% HH Income Dist.
Elementary 1.7% 54.7% CDU 4.1% 8.25% <19,000 26.8% 74.9%
Secondary 21.1% 19.1% Small Parties 5.3% 7.0% [19,001;40,000] 29.1% 17.8%
High 77.1% 17.1% Blank + Null 8.2% 3.8% >40,001 44.1% 7.3%
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016; Pordtata;INE. Questionnaire in the appendix.
Table 3: Description of the variables used
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Probvote (Dummy) 74.4% 0.434 Probdecis. Legis. (P ) .007 .026 Easy Vote (C) 71.5% 0.452
Probvote (ML) 2.72 0.51 Probdecis. Pres. (P ) .007 .025 Duty (D) 89.8% 0.303
duty post treat 66.6% 0.472 Probdecis. Aut. (P ) .009 .028 Pol. Interest 74.1% 0.438
Voted Legis. 90.4% 0.294 Di↵. Legis. ( ) 76.7% 24.8 Pol. Filiation 15.6% 0.363
Voted Pres. 85.3% 0.354 Di↵. Pres. ( ) 76.5% 26.2 Peer Pressure 92.6% 0.263
Voted Aut. 87.6% 0.330 Di↵. Aut. ( ) 70.6% 29.1 Placebo Treat. 31.8% -
Duty Treat. 35.8% - Pivotal Treat. 32.3% -
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016; Pordtata;INE. Questionnaire in the appendix.
As shown in the tables above, individuals in the sample are mostly well educated (77.1%)
and have high income(73.2%). The majority lives in the Lisbon area (61.1%) and is inter-
ested in politics (74%). Usually, there is a problem of self-selection, as individuals interested
in politics, and therefore more likely to turnout, are more willing to give up their free time
and answer a survey.
It is also plausible the existence of a sample bias towards education and income as
the survey was mainly distributed through social media, being expected to exist an higher
share of wealthier and well educated people responding.29 Geographically, Lisbon is also
overrepresented.30 Overall, the dataset has several limitations regarding its external validity.
Most of them are common for this type of survey and the way it was distributed. I try to
minimize these limitations, controlling for the possible biases.
Next, I analyse turnout and voting results in my sample. Turnout was 90.4% in leg-
islative elections, 85.3% in presidential elections and 87.6% in municipal elections. A large
majority of respondents (74.4%) claims to be politically interested.   is almost equal in
29http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/
30It is the region where must of my personal network is located.
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Table 4: Turnout sorted by vote importance and sense of duty.
Votes if it does not matter Sense of Duty
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Voted Yes 90% 1% 91% 84% 6% 90%
in last legislative No 7% 2% 9% 6% 3% 10%
election Total 97% 3% 100% 91% 9% 100%
legislative and presidential elections and slightly lower in municipal elections. All these
results are substantially higher than the ones registered in the elections, evidencing an over-
representation of voters in my sample. Although this is an issue (as the sample is not
totally representative), this was already expected. Previous findings suggest that individual
datasets (built from surveys) usually overestimate their percentage of voters (Sciarini and
Goldberg, 2015).
Table 4 shows that most of the individuals who voted or abstained in the last legislative
elections (2015) would turnout even if their vote did not matter.31 These results seem to
corroborate the idea that voters do not show a pivotal behaviour as respondents answer they
would cast their vote even if it did not matter (Blais, 2000), an issue further explained below.
Table 4 also evidences that the majority (90%) of respondents considers voting to be a
civic duty, suggesting that individuals with sense of duty may be overrepresented in this
dataset. Previous empirical work already found high proportions of respondents reporting to
have sense of duty, suggesting individuals tend to report what is socially acceptable (Blais,
2010).
5 Empirical Strategy
In this section I describe my methodology in both the analysis of the calculus of voting and
the randomized controlled trial. Commonly all my analysis I use the same set of variables




controlling for individuals’ characteristics, Ā.32 Where:
Āi = ⌧1masci + ⌧2agei + ⌧3lvtghti + ⌧4empi + ⌧5northi + ⌧6lisi + ⌧7southi+
+⌧
8
isldi + ⌧9highincomei + tau10higheduci + ⌧11reli + ⌧12lvabroadi
(2)
5.1 Analysis of the calculus of voting
I start by studying the determinants of voting in the past Portuguese legislative, presidential
and municipal elections. Are voters instrumental or non-instrumental? Do they vote because
they feel it as a civic duty, just like theory predicts (Blais, 2000)? The relevant dependant
variable, vtd is a dummy (voted or abstained) and it results from a latent variable, V in (1),
which is not observed. When V is greater than 0, vtd is equal to 1, otherwise it is equal to
0.
I undertake two di↵erent strategies. The first entails an estimation the determinants
of turnout for each of the three types of election considered (legislative, municipal, and
presidential). In the second, I build a panel data set with two dimensions (individual and
type of election) and thus estimate fixed e↵ects for each type of election.
The first analysis consists in estimating the cross-sectional probit equation (3) three
times, one for each type of election.33
vtdi = ↵+ Āi + Pi i + D̄i + C̄i + ✏i, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . (3)
where i is the individual,  is the election type (legislative, municipal, or presidential), and
P  , D and C are defined as follows:
Pi i =  1diffi +  2probdecisi +  3expbeni, D̄i = ✓dutyi, C̄i =  2ezyvotei
Next, I focus on the legislative elections of 2015 and estimate separately the same analysis
for individuals with sense of duty and without, using equation 3. The sense of duty was
measured as the answer to the question In your case, you consider voting to be a duty?.
32To economise on notation, I shall drop the subscripts whenever their use is not strictly necessary to
convey the message.
33Assuming normality of the error terms.
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The hypothesis is that determinants of voting di↵er and P,   and C are not expected to
significantly impact individuals with high sense of duty, while impacting individuals with
low sense of duty (Blais, 2000).
I now turn to the panel analysis, which allows me to test the hypothesis referred in the
literature that turnout should be higher in legislative election than in municipal elections,
and there should be no statistical di↵erence between legislative and presidential (Blais,
2000).
The panel estimation can be defined as:
vtdij = ↵+ Āi + ¯Pij ij + D̄i + C̄i + ◆1presi + ◆2auti + ✏ij , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , j 2 {L,P,M} (4)
where i is the individual, j is the election type – legislative L (omitted category), presidential
P , municipal M –, and legisij, presij, and autij are indicators of the type of election to
which the turnout decision vtdij refers.
5.2 The Mobilization Model
I assess this model very briefly as it accounts for variables not included in the previous sec-
tion. I try to understand if individuals vote because they have a general interest in politics,
because they may feel pressured by their peers, friends or family or because they belong to a
political party. According to previous findings, social networks should have a higher impact
than individual political interest and filiation in the voting decision (Magalhães 2008). The
regression can be estimated as follows:
vtdlesi = ↵+ Āi + M̄i + ✏i (5)
And M̄ is defined as:
M̄i = ⇠1intrst+ ⇠2set peerpress+ ⇠3filiated (6)
5.3 Randomized Controlled Trial
This analysis aims to study the impact of both sense of duty and pivotal treatments in the
intention of voting in future legislative elections. More specifically, the respondents answer
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the following question: If the next legislative elections were to happen tomorrow, how likely
would you go vote?. I coded the answer to this question in two alternative ways. The first ias
a multinomial variable including several degrees of certainty and therefore I use a bivariate
ordered probit approach..34 This definition of the future intention to vote entails defining a
ordered categorical variable that ranges between 1 and 3, corresponding impossible, unsure,
and certain. Second, I define the intention of future voting as a dummy with value 1 if
individuals are certain to vote in the future and 0 otherwise. In this case I use a bivariate
probit estimation.35
All the second-stage regressions use the controls used previously in the calculus of voting
and mobilization estimations. I allow individuals to be influenced at the same time by both
rational choice factors such as P ,   and D but also by mobilization factors such as political
interest, party filiation, and peer pressure.
I hypothesise the pivotal treatment has a negative impact in future voting intentions.
However, one must account for the possibility, suggested by Blais (2000), that individuals
usually do not perceive probabilities correctly. The sense of duty treatment should cause
an increase future voting intentions, as suggested by previous findings (Gine and Mansuri,
2010, and Dale and Strauss, 2009).36
5.3.1 The Sense of Duty Treatment
The variable duty post treat, measures individual’s sense of duty after the treatment.37 As
will be clear when I discuss my results, and following the literature, the sense of duty is
one of the main determinants of the act of voting. However, this may result from reverse
causality, as there may be an underlying preference that makes people vote and have report
high sense of duty, and it may also be that the act of voting contributes to building the sense
of duty. My sense of duty treatment respects, by construction, the exclusion restriction, as
34See Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
35See, e.g., Chiburis et. al (2011) for a recommendation of the usage of this methodology in this specific
context (causality of a dummy treatment in a dummy outcome variable).
36The pivotal treatment shows people that the Portuguese political system is designed such that thousands
of votes are not used to elect members of parliament (Hondt Method). The sense of duty treatment shows
how voting is important as a civic duty.
37More specifically, it results from the answer to the following question: What are the main reasons for
you to vote?, being sense of duty one of the options.
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it is prompted randomly to the respondents and is therefore not correlated with the decision
to vote. Moreover, as it will be seen, it has an impact on the sense of duty reported after
the treatment. I therefore instrument the variable duty post treat with the treatment.38The
first stage regression is defined as:
duty post treati = ↵+ Āi + D̄i + '1intrst+ '2ezyvote+ '3difflegis+
+'
4
setpeerpress+ '5treat placebo+ '6treat duty +  i
(7)
I combine a set of explanatory variables from both the previous calculus of voting estimation
(D̄i, ezyvote and di✏egis) which I expect to impact duty, and the mobilization estimation
(intrst and filiated).
The second stage regression is given by
probvotei = ↵+ Āi + C̄i + D̄i + Pi i + M̄i + #1treat placebo+ #2 \duty post treati + ✏i (8)
5.3.2 The Pivotal Treatment
In the pivotal treatment I use the variable probdecisl, instrumented by the pivotal treat-
ment, which respects the exclusion restriction by construction. Referred to P in (1), it
accounts for the probability of being pivotal and was measured after the treatments being
presented.39The first stage regression is defined as:
probdecis highi = ↵+ %1Āi + %2ezyvotei + %3dutyi + %4difflegisi+
+%
5
intrsti + %6filiatedi + %7treat placebo+  i
(9)
The second stage regression can be described as:
probvotei = ↵+ ⌫1Āi + ⌫2ezyvotei + ⌫3dutyi + ⌫4difflegisi+
+⌫
5
intrsti + ⌫6filiatedi + ⌫7set peerpressi + ⌫8treat placebo+ ⌫9probdecis highi + µi
(10)
The error terms ✏i,  i,  i and µi are assumed to be stochastic, i.i.d. and normally distributed.
38Definition of a good instrument as in Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
39Respondents were asked to answer the question: In your opinion what is the probability your vote is
pivotal in the case of a tie between two candidates?. Several answer options were provided (1 in 10, 1 in




In this section I first present the results of my analysis of the calculus of voting, followed by
the mobilization estimation and the randomized controlled trial.
6.1 Calculus of Voting
The results of estimating Equation (1) are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Results of the calculus of voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cross Sectional Panel
Legislative Presidential Municipal Coe cients Marginal E↵ects
ezyvote 0.766*** 0.0641 0.636*** 0.599*** 0.0669***
(0.149) (0.192) (0.185) (0.120) (0.0130)
duty 0.692*** 0.478* 0.613** 0.799*** 0.0892***
(0.177) (0.257) (0.243) (0.147) (0.0157)
expben -0.0525 -0.0354 -0.0962 -0.0437 -0.00488
(0.0706) (0.0669) (0.109) (0.0636) (0.00710)
di↵ 0.00844*** 0.00293 -0.00171 0.00295* 0.000329*
(0.00248) (0.00304) (0.00272) (0.00168) (0.000189)
probdecis 1.229 10.34 7.935 2.893 0.323





cons -0.372 -0.0533 0.644 -0.476
(0.393) (0.494) (0.489) (0.312)
N 875 829 828 2532 2532
Log lik. -216.4 -177.8 -150.0 -596.0
Chi-squared 79.61 82.16 61.56 114.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016.
Complete table and questionnaire in the Appendix. Variable labels in Table 1.
Columns [(1), (2) and (3)], report the cross-sectional results for each type of election.
Sense of duty has a positive significant impact in turnout in all cases. This makes sense as
table 4 showed most of respondents have sense of duty, confirming previous findings in the
literature (Blais, 2000). Higher costs of voting cause a statistically significant decrease in
turnout for legislative and municipal elections. Conversely, P does not have a statistically
significant impact for any type of election. However, in legislative elections   seems to be
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statistically significant increasing voters’ turnout. This is a signal that individuals care more
about national legislative elections than presidential or municipal (Blais, 2000).
Overall, individuals’ voting decision is consistently driven by its cost and by sense of
duty. On average, those considering voting to be easy have more 6.69pp in the probability
of voting while having sense of duty increases it by 8.92pp. As already referred, sense of duty
is non-instrumental. The voting cost, although included in the calculus of voting, is a direct
cost paid by the voter, which is independent of the election result. Taken together with the
fact that the expected benefit is non-significant, suggests that voters do not take into account
the election outcome when making their turnout decision. Following this reasoning, when
observing   one must understand the idiosyncrasies of the legislative elections of 2015.40
The panel regression results also suggest that in municipal elections, voters are more likely to
turnout. One possible explanation is that the smaller number of voters causes a perception
that an individual vote is worth more. This conclusion should be taken with caution, as it
goes against our previous findings that voters are non-instrumental.
Table 6: Results of the calculus of voting, sorted by duty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
With Duty No Duty
Legislative Marginal E↵ects Legislative Marginal E↵ects
ezyvote 0.638*** 0.0762*** 1.308*** 0.300***
(0.166) (0.0196) (0.504) (0.0943)
expbenlegis -0.264** -0.0315** -0.00613 -0.00141
(0.103) (0.0125) (0.176) (0.0404)
di✏egis 0.00931*** 0.00111*** 0.00820 0.00188
(0.00281) (0.000341) (0.00604) (0.00138)
probdecisl 20.55** 2.452** -20.95* -4.802*
(9.136) (1.114) (12.01) (2.682)
cons 0.424 -0.488
(0.400) (1.114)
N 798 798 77 77
Log lik. -177.1 -31.78
Chi-squared 44.30 29.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016.
Complete table and questionnaire in the Appendix. Variable labels in Table 1.
Focusing in the legislative elections, Table 6, columns [(1) and (2)] report the results
40More than a typical election, that moment served to evaluate the performance of the incumbent gov-
ernment, which had to rule and apply a very strict austerity program. At the time, public opinion was very
emotional and it could be possible voters felt those elections to be of greater importance, increasing  .
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and marginal e↵ects for the subsample of individuals with sense of duty, while [(3) and (4)]
report for individuals without sense of duty. The findings do not confirm Blais (2000)’s
results, since I observe that individuals with sense of duty perform the calculus of voting
when deciding to turnout, whereas Blais concluded that this calculus was performed by
individuals without sense of duty.41 One possibility is that respondents showing sense of
duty may also be interested in politics and therefore they care more about the elections and
their results.
6.2 The Mobilization Model
The results of estimation Equation 5 are in Table 7:
Table 7: Results of the mobilization estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cross Sectional Panel
Legislative Presidential Municipal Estimation Marginal E↵ects
intrst 0.485*** 0.543*** 0.312** 0.417*** 0.0764***
(0.158) (0.148) (0.153) (0.125) (0.0229)
peerpress 0.298 0.334* 0.458** 0.345** 0.0633**
(0.197) (0.198) (0.188) (0.166) (0.0306)
filiated 0.497** 0.00664 0.504*** 0.239** 0.0439**





cons 0.428 -0.716** -0.225 -0.238
(0.333) (0.324) (0.318) (0.268)
N 908 926 926 2760 2760
Log lik. -256.6 -326.4 -301.4
Chi-squared 51.25 102.7 79.38 112.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016.
Complete table and questionnaire in the Appendix. Variable labels in Table 1.
Results show that individual interest in politics has a positive significant impact in
turnout in all types of elections, confirming previous findings (Verba et. Al, 1995). Party
filiation has a significant impact in all elections except presidential, which makes sense
41The low number of observations I used in the estimation for individuals with low sense of duty may
explain the the low significance
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since the latter are more personalized and candidates do not represent a party.42 There is
mixed evidence on pressure from family and friends, with significant positive impact only in
presidential and municipal elections. These results are intriguing in the case of legislative
elections as political filiation has an impact (as expected, since political parties mobilize
theirs members to turnout) but not mobilization from family and friends, whom usually are
closer to the individual. Pressure from family and friends is significant when controlling
for the type of election in the panel regression. Finally, the results contradict previous
findings in the literature (Magalhães, 2008) as political interest seems to have a similar
(or, if anything, slightly stronger) impact than social networks (family, friends and party
filiation). One possible explanation can be di↵erent formulations of the questions asked
in both datasets, such that although they measure similar e↵ects, they are not the same.
Although, the e↵ect of social networks in the Portuguese electorate seems to require further
research.
6.3 Randomized Controlled Trial
Table 8 reports the results of the treatments approach. Sense of duty treatment seems to be
a good instrument for duty post treat as it has a significant positive impact in it, as shown
in column (1). Also, duty post treat has a significant positive impact on future turnout.The
Average treatment e↵ect is an increase of 3.4pp in the intention of future voting.43These
results suggest a causal e↵ect of the sense of duty treatment in future individual turnout.
Easier voting, political interest and filiation, peer pressure also seem to have a positive
impact, confirming previous results from tables 5 and 7.
The pivotal treatment has intriguing results, as it shows that telling people that their
vote does not matter increases P . Based in the literature, I hypothesized the opposite. A
higher P significantly decreases the intention of future voting, going against predictions.
One can put forward several explanations for these results. First, individuals may not
42according Portuguese law presidential candidates cannot be funded by political parties.
43We have computed the marginal e↵ects of the instrumented duty post treat on the intention of future
voting using an adaptation of the Stata code suggested by Jones (2005).
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understand well probabilities.44 Second, there is a chance that the question in the survey
was not properly formulated and thus misunderstood. Third, respondents might not have
understood the treatment.45
Table 8: Results of the randomized controlled trial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sense of Duty Pivotal
Pseudo first-stage Dummy Multinomial Pseudo first-stage Dummy Multinomial
duty post treat 1.698*** 1.557***
(0.570) (0.325)






ezyvote 0.156 0.666*** 0.597*** 0.0524 0.666*** 0.604***
(0.167) (0.141) (0.127) (0.159) (0.152) (0.131)
expbenlegis -0.0319 0.00697 -0.00570 0.00141
(0.0662) (0.0653) (0.0246) (0.0293)
probdecisl 2.228 -1.244
(5.245) (4.933)
di✏egis 0.0124*** 0.0110*** -0.000638 0.0117*** 0.0110***
(0.00215) (0.00184) (0.00217) (0.00229) (0.00191)
duty 1.984*** -0.0398 0.0105 0.241 1.093*** 1.036***
(0.171) (0.445) (0.254) (0.199) (0.170) (0.142)
intrst 0.425*** 0.120 0.142 0.0421 0.221 0.281**
(0.157) (0.144) (0.130) (0.159) (0.147) (0.131)
filiated -0.262* 0.367** 0.403*** 0.669*** 0.507*** 0.500***
(0.152) (0.148) (0.151) (0.128) (0.143) (0.153)
peerpress 0.275 0.309* 0.228 0.257
(0.184) (0.179) (0.175) (0.177)
treat placebo 0.133 0.0626 0.0845 0.130 0.0371 0.0467
(0.140) (0.109) (0.105) (0.123) (0.104) (0.102)
constant -0.908** -2.704*** -1.014*** -1.954***
(0.377) (0.362) (0.347) (0.436)
N 895 895 895 895
Log lik. -659.9 -724.5 -796.7 -863.6
Chi-squared 486.7 226.0 327.4 239.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Pseudo first-stage refers do the dummy estimation and is very similar to the one in multinomial.
Source: dataset collected via Qualtrics online platform, between November and December, 2016.
Complete table and questionnaire in the Appendix. Variable labels in Table 1.
44See Blais (2000).
45Individuals may not understand the pivotal treatment if they do not understand the Hondt method and




In this work, I provide a comprehensive analysis of a dataset of 1211 Portuguese voters, that
results from a survey that I have built and collected. My results suggest that Portuguese
voters turnout for both instrumental and non-instrumental motives. My main conclusions
can be summarised as follows. First, Portuguese voters are consistently sensitive to voting
costs. If they perceive voting go be harder, they are less likely to turnout. Also, they seem to
scale di↵erently the importance of each type of election, as the benefit resulting from each one
is di↵erent and usually higher in legislative elections. The probability of a voter being pivotal
almost never has a significant impact in the turnout decision. Some strange results from
the pivotal treatment suggest individuals do not quite understand probabilities. Further
research is needed about individuals’ understanding of pivotal probabilities. Voters’ turnout
rate is also positively impacted by political interest, peer pressure and political filiation
(except presidential elections, in which parties involvement is less notorious), confirming
theory and suggesting that mobilization factors a↵ect voters’ turnout.
I obtain convincing evidence that the sense of duty has a causal impact on the intention
of future voting. Moreover, providing information about the importance of the act of voting
increases the individual sense of duty. My results suggest that individuals vote because of
the act of voting and not necessarily to a↵ect the outcome of the election. I call this warm
glow voting, a close relative of the term warm glow giving, coined by Andreoni (1990)..46
One needs to bear in mind that the data used in this work was collected during a time period
of no elections and therefore the likelihood of future voting is no more than a manifested
intention. It could be interesting to make the same natural experiment at the time of
an election and collecting a representative sample. In my experiment I use information
provided by o cial agencies, but an alternative could be studying the impact in turnout of
key opinion leaders, such as sports stars or music idols, producing statements about their
sense of duty and praising people who vote.
Finally, it could be interesting to further study the impact of polls in voters’ turnout.
46The adaptation to an election framework of the original idea of warm glow by Andreoni (1990) was
already explored by Conley et al. (2006).
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Nowadays, and during the year os 2016, several elections’ results were against all expecta-
tions and polls predictions. Also, more research needs to be done on individuals’ coordina-
tion and strategic e↵ects regarding turnout. As Blais (2000) refers, the calculus of voting
provides a rational framework for the turnout decision, but it is only partial. Strategic
and more game theoretical frameworks could provide important tools to better understand
voting motivations of the Portuguese electorate.
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